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Abstrac: The present article offers perspectives on the possible adaptation of traditional connec-
ting factors to the digital space. It analyses cases that pit platform users against each other and cases that 
pit platform users against the digital platform itself. For the first set of cases, reliable guidance is offered 
by the principle of effectiveness. The enforcement of court decisions in cyberspace is often necessary 
and also plainly sufficient to render justice. Enhanced protection of weaker parties is advocated, both in 
tortious (favor laesi) and contractual liability (protection of the weaker party), in line with the most re-
cent achievements in human rights due diligence. Protection clauses leading to destination-based labour 
standards would be a welcome step forward. Protection of users also offers guidance for the shaping of 
private international law rules governing disputes between users and the platform. 
Keywords: Connecting factors, Principle of Effectiveness, Favor Laesi, Tortious liability, Party 
autonomy, Consumer contracts, B2B relations, Digital platforms.
   Resumen: El presente artículo ofrece perspectivas sobre las posibles adaptaciones de los puntos 
de conexión tradicionales al espacio digital. Proporciona análisis de casos que enfrentan a los usuarios 
de la plataforma entre sí y casos que enfrentan a los usuarios de la plataforma con la propia plataforma 
digital. Para el primer conjunto de casos, el principio de eficacia y el de favor laesi ofrecen una orienta-
ción fiable. La colaboración de plataformas digitales para permitir la ejecución de decisiones judiciales 
en el ciberespacio se considera necesaria y suficiente para garantizar el acceso efectivo a la justicia. En 
cuanto al segundo, se aboga por una mayor protección de las partes más débiles, en consonancia con los 
logros más recientes de debida diligencia en materia de derechos humanos. Las cláusulas de protección 
que conducen estándares de trabajo basados en el destino representarían un paso adelante positivo.
   Palabras clave: puntos de conexión, principio de efectividad, Favor Laesi, responsabilidad ex-
tracontractual, autonomía de las partes, relaciones B2B, plataformas digitales.
Summary: I. Introduction. II. Litigation Between Platform Users. 1. The Importance of 
Effectiveness and the Role of the Place of Enforcement. 2. Favor Laesi. A) Favor Laesi in Contract 
Law. B) Favor Laesi in Working Services. III. Relations Between a User and a Platform Exercising 
Decisive Control. 1. When the Platform Exercises Decisive Control. 2. When the Platform Does not 
Exercise Decisive Control. IV. Some Conclusions.
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I. Introduction
1. When I pronounce the word Future, the first syllable already belongs to the past” a Polish 
poem reminds us1.
2. “This “already past” future is difficult to fully understand, let alone regulate. Digital platforms 
are often accused of having disruptive effects on many of the world’s human societies and on society as 
a whole2. And since society is almost synonymous with law – because one cannot exist without the other 
–, digital platforms are also disruptive of the law. 
3. The most disruptive effect consists in what has been described as the “functional sovereignty”3 
enjoyed by digital firms. In the first years of the new millennium, nation states were taken by surprise 
and were unprepared for the task of governing the rise of the tech oligopoly of digital platforms. High 
courts have been the first to react to the existing legal vacua that have boosted digital platforms into 
the present monopolies and oligopolies4. The CJEU and the Swiss Supreme Courts have tried unilateral 
ways to challenge the use – and abuse – of freedom of establishment to practise tax avoidance tactics5. If 
it weren’t tragic, it would seem ironic that companies celebrating cyberspace and its absence of borders 
– connecting the world – have happily taken advantage of the territorial scope of application of tax laws. 
4. Activities carried out on the web have long benefitted from law-free spaces that are inaccessible 
to rules with a precise territorial scope. This has caused the well-known inequalities, both vertically and ho-
rizontally. Horizontally in terms of competition law infringements6 and vertically for many reasons inclu-
ding the impoverishment of the welfare state, which is endangering its long-term survival. Adaptation of 
the present tax rules to the digital economy is only a matter of time7. Meanwhile, however, monopolies and 
oligopolies are already there and are acknowledged as the only possible gatekeepers of their own market8. 
1 “The three oddest words”, by WIslaWa szymborska, translated by s. baranczak & c. cavanagh. The poem goes on to 
say “When I pronounce the word Silence, I destroy it./ When I pronounce the word Nothing, I make something no non-being 
can hold”. The present article maintains the oral text of the presentation given to the University Carlos III in the framework of 
the Congress “Legal Tech” (Madrid, 16 November 2020). 
2 See T. rodríguez de las heras ballell, “Legal challenges of artificial intelligence: modelling the disruptive features of 
emerging technologies and assessing their possible legal impact”, Uniform Law Review, June 2019, pp. 302–314; “The Legal 
Anatomy of Electronic Platforms: A Prior Study to Assess the Need of a Law of Platforms in the EU”, The Italian Law Journal, 
2017 and “Rules for a Platform Economy: A Case for Harmonisation to Counter “Platform Shopping” in the Digital Economy”, 
in I. PretellI (ed), Conflict of Laws in the Maze of Digital Platforms, Genève / Zurich 2018.
3 A. morellI/O. PollIcIno, “Metaphors, Judicial Frames and Fundamental Rights in Cyberspace”, American Journal 
of Comparative Law, 2020, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3422946 p. 26, note 66 quoting Pasquale, “From 
Territorial to Functional Sovereignty: The Case of Amazon”, Law and Political Economy, Dec. 6, 2017, https://lpeblog.
org/2017/12/06/from-territorial-to-functional-sovereignty-the-case-ofamazon/ 
4 A. turIna, Which ‘Source Taxation’ for the Digital Economy?, Intertax, v. 46, 6/7, 2018, pp. 495 – 519. 
5 See also, on the so called “Danish cases” of the CJEU [CJEU, Joined cases C-116/16 and joined cases C-115/16]: S. baer-
entzen, “Danish Cases on the Use of Holding Companies for Cross-Border Dividends and Interest – A New Test to Disentangle 
Abuse from Real Economic Activity?”, World Tax Journal, February 2020, pp. 3- 52. On the Swiss case [Swiss Supreme Court, 
decision 2C_354/2018 of 20 April 2020] R. danon, B. malek, “Swiss Supreme Court Refers to the CJEU “Danish cases” in 
Outbound Dividend Case Involving the Swiss-EU Savings Agreement”, Kluwer International Tax Blog, July 23, 2020 online 
at http://kluwertaxblog.com/2020/07/23/swiss-supreme-court-refers-to-the-cjeu-danish-cases-in-outbound-dividend-case-in-
volving-the-swiss-eu-savings-agreement/#_edn5 (13.12.2020). 
6 L. khan, “Amazon’s antitrust paradox”, The Yale Law Journal, 2017, 126, 3, pp. 564–907; https://www.cnbc.com/2017/12/19/
more-than-75-percent-of-us-online-consumers-shop-on-amazon-most-of- the-time.html. stIgler commIttee on dIgItal Plat-
forms, Final Report, September 2019, p.17, available at https://research.chicagobooth.edu/stigler/media/news/committee-on-dig-
ital-platforms-final-report.
7 Two years ago, the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework approved a “Programme of Work to Develop a Consensus Solution 
to the Tax Challenges Arising from the Digitalisation of the Economy”, OECD 2019, acknowledging the need for and pro-
moting significant reforms of the international tax system via the reallocation of taxing rights and the introduction of a global 
minimum tax.
8 See for instance, “Digital Services Act package: Ex ante regulatory instrument for large online platforms with signifi-
cant network effects acting as gate-keepers in the European Union’s internal market”, on line at https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/
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5. Amazon Mechanical Turk (2005), Facebook (opened to the public in 2006), Airbnb (2008), 
Instagram (2010) and Uber (2011) exert an effective and efficient regulatory control over the terms and 
conditions for the sale of goods, services and data9. The effective power of self-regulation is coupled 
with that of self-enforcement of the rules. These characteristics create a not inconsiderable difference 
between a digital platform and a traditional firm, but the former may still only be subject to the legis-
lation drawn up for the latter.  The present legal orders, each of which is intended to be sovereign in its 
own territory, like the Westphalian treaties of 1648, are now increasingly in need of platform collabo-
ration in order to dispense justice. In criminal cases, much of the information necessary for allowing 
criminal evidence is indisputably out of reach without the collaboration of digital platforms.
6. Trying to access the data stored in a private account, pursuing an offender guilty of deadly 
revenge porn, or simply trying to implement laws on the protection of privacy or checking if labour 
standards are being met requires the collaboration of the company which holds and owns the technology 
that has enabled the wrongful act, the transaction or the service. 
7. Against this background, judges and practitioners are left attempting to solve the new legal 
problems arising in the digital space using private international law rules that were developed in the last 
two centuries of the previous millennium. 
The whole concept of private international law is based on the mechanism of geographical allo-
cation of the problem to be solved. This concept has recently been replaced with that of pursuing univer-
sally shared policy goals through private international law. When it is a question of protecting platform 
users against the platform, the policy goals may differ from those underlying the solving of quaestiones 
iuris generated by the platform between two users.  
II. Litigation Between Platform Users
8. The simplest scenario is that of litigation between platform users who have met as a conse-
quence of being “matched” by a platform’s algorithm. 
9. In all cases where the digital platform has only served to “match” supply and demand, private 
international law rules do not need to be specifically adapted for the purposes of litigation between users, 
since the human and social relationship takes place in a given territory and will be subject to its rules. 
In other words, the fact that Uber, Airbnb or Taskrabbit is based in a different state from the one 
in which the contract is fulfilled is irrelevant and does not offer a foreign element sufficient to trigger 
the need for private international law rules and instruments. Litigation between a passenger and an Uber 
driver or between a guest and an Airbnb host may be deemed not to have a cross-border element. They 
will be normally subject to the legal order in which the service is provided10. 
More complex, and more interesting, are the cases of litigation between users who do not meet 
in the real world.




9 stIgler rePort 2019 (note 7), p. 17.
10 Sullivan v. Oracle Corp., 254 P.3d 237, 247 (Cal. 2011) stating that California labour laws govern work performed in 
California and that the laws of the states where the platform is based (Arizona and Colorado) could not be referred to to avoid 
the due payment of overtime work benefitting a California-based employer.
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1. The Importance of Effectiveness and the Role of the Place of Enforcement 
10. One of the first ideas developed to ensure appropriate allocation of a cross-border case was 
that the entity capable of enforcing its own point of view should impose it11. 
In the digital space, this principle could justify private enforcement and there are advocates of 
this simple and liberal solution, especially when it comes to self-regulating systems such as the block-
chain12. In addition to being a reality and a consequence of a legal vacuum, the power of platforms to 
impose their own rules has been justified on the grounds that transactions taking place on the platform 
cannot be anchored to any physical space, especially when automated, as they are in the blockchain or 
on other platforms which do not play a role of intermediating goods and services.
However, nation states and the European Union are based on constitutional values that represent 
a major obstacle to this liberal solution. 
Classical private international law is therefore still regarded as an unavoidable tool to enable 
state legislation to be imposed.   
11. Drawing on the principle of effectiveness, more flexible criteria have led to the principe de 
proximité, on the assumption that every cross-border dispute should be allocated to the legal order that 
is closest to it. Although the closest connection may go beyond a geographical location (the place where 
the service is provided) and extend to cultural and anthropological proximity (the psychological expec-
tations of the parties, their common language, their belonging to the same society), its identification – 
especially when it takes place ex post – often seems artificial, if not arbitrary. 
12. As a consequence, neutral methods of allocation have given way to connecting factors based 
on shared constitutional values. The most pertinent of these in the digital space are the ones that favour 
weak parties such as consumers or maintenance creditors in the law-selection process. The same is true 
of civil compensation for victims of cyber-bullying or other criminal acts.
13. Despite the fact that platform-based social relationships do not necessarily take place in a 
physical space, viable solutions are provided by the arsenal developed in the last century to identify 
appropriate connecting factors for human relationships resulting from “matches” created by algorithms. 
14. The practical implications of digital relationships do not exist in a realm separate from the 
real world, and do not escape the laws that govern it within the complex architecture of private interna-
tional law. In civil and commercial matters, EU private international law regulations are easily adaptable 
to cyberspace, provided that the place of enforcement is correctly understood and identified. 
15. Judges and interpreters are applying the existing Rome I, Rome II and Brussels I bis Re-
gulation to human interactions taking place on the web, which were not affected by, for instance, the 
recent Regulation (EU) 2019/1150 promoting fairness and transparency for business users of online 
intermediation services.
It is possible that the same approach will be followed by the Digital Services Act, despite an 
effort to impose obligations on companies established outside the EU.  
It is still uncertain whether these developments will take account of the existing case law, which 
is already very rich in lessons to be learned.
11 Originally, F. kahn, Gesetzeskollisionen, Verlag von Duncker & Humblot, München & Leipzig, 1928 (1891), pp. 31-
46 had referred to the expression Näherberechtigung, the closest competence. The idea was then taken up by m. Wolff, who 
speaks in this regard of the search for the greatest proximity (der größeren Nahe) and also by W. Wengler. Traditionally, the 
principle did not seem to have any significance as regards intangible things that do not have physical existence. Later, a fic-
titious location even for intangible property was admitted as a kind of analogy. The law of the place of enforcement presents 
several advantages and, above all, predictability for the creditor (or their assignees) and third parties, in addition to providing 
effective guarantees to the debtor. 
12 See S. rIva, “Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs) in the Swiss Legal Order”, Yearbook of Private Interna-
tional Law, Volume 21, 2019/2020, pp. 601-638 and the reference therein. 
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16. We will first examine cases of patent infringement and secondly cases of defamation. 
17. The CJEU was confronted with a case opposing an Austrian-based trader – Wintersteiger – 
and a German on-line advertiser13.
Using the advertising platform Google.de, a German advertiser had reserved an “adWord” co-
rresponding to the trademark registered in Austria by a company. As a consequence, users of the search 
engine wanting to buy the Austrian products of Wintersteiger were directed to the German retailer thanks 
to the advertisement appearing at the top of the search results in Google.de. The jurisdiction of Austrian 
courts was difficult to anchor: on the one hand, the damage seemed to be located within the digital search 
engine Google.de; on the other, the search engine was also accessible from Austria. The CJEU recogni-
sed Austrian jurisdiction on the grounds that Austria was both the place where the infringed trademark 
was registered and the place where the event produced its damaging effects. However, the Court held 
that the defendant could also be sued in Germany, since the forum damni ex art. 5-3 EU Regulation 
44/2001, i.e. the special forum of the Brussels I system, includes the place of establishment of the user 
of Google AdWords, the author of the damage.
By contrast, no relevance is given to the fact that “the technical display process by the adver-
tiser is activated, ultimately, on a server belonging to the operator of the search engine used by the 
advertiser”. The reason is the lack of foreseeability of a connecting factor based on the location of the 
server14. What is “definite and identifiable, both for the applicant and for the defendant”, is the “place of 
establishment of the advertiser”. That place is both the place to which the connecting factor of (the then) 
Article 5-3 pointed as the place “where the activation of the display process is decided” and the place of 
enforcement “likely to facilitate the taking of evidence and the conduct of the proceedings”. 
18. A leading Canadian case concerns prohibition of the distribution of products that infringe a 
company’s intellectual property rights15. This is a more delicate case, because the plaintiffs ignored the 
place of establishment of the company that caused them damage,  and, for that reason, court orders could 
be easily disregarded. 
“Despite court orders prohibiting the sale of inventory [the foreign company] continues to carry 
on its business from an unknown location, selling its impugned product on its websites to customers all 
over the world”. 
This being the case, it was clear that Google was the only entity able to enforce the court orders. 
On the other hand, the search engine’s cooperation and compliance were plainly sufficient to put an end 
to the copyright infringement. 
The most appropriate space where the court order could be, and eventually was, successfully 
enforced was the Google website, a digital space. 
19. What lessons can be learned from these two cases? 
13 See CJEU, 19 April 2012, Wintersteiger AG v Products 4U Sondermaschinenbau GmbH, [ECLI:EU:C:2012:220].
14 Ibid. pt. 36: “It is true that the technical display process by the advertiser is activated, ultimately, on a server belonging to 
the operator of the search engine used by the advertiser. However, in view of the objective of foreseeability, which the rules on 
jurisdiction must pursue, the place of establishment of that server cannot, by reason of its uncertain location, be considered to 
be the place where the event giving rise to the damage occurred for the purpose of the application of Article 5(3) of Regulation 
No 44/2001”. Initially, many voices suggested that a possible head of jurisdiction to attract a tech giant operating globally such 
as Google to appear before of a forum was the place where its servers were located. However, Google has never disclosed where 
the servers operating its search engine are, and data can easily be moved from one server to another.
15 Google v. Equustek 2017 SCC 34. The Supreme Court of Canada upheld an order directing Google to block certain web-
sites so that they did not appear in any Google search results anywhere in the world. The respondent justified the new solution 
by quoting Newbury J. [Mooney v. Orr (1994), 98 B.C.L.R. (2d) 318 (S.C.)], para. 11: “the courts must, in order to preserve 
the effectiveness of their judgments, adapt to new circumstances. Such adaptability has always been, and continues to be, the 
genius of the common law”. See G. clarke, Case Comment Mooney v. ORR, 53 Advocate (Vancouver) 431 (1995). See R. 
flemIng, “Google v. Equustek; Jurisdiction over the global internet”, https://www.irglobal.com/article/google-v-equustek-ju-
risdiction-over-the-global-internet/.
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The first lesson is that the location of servers is not a viable connecting factor. Although it is 
often referred to, and has served in certain decisions, as a connecting factor, data can easily be moved 
from one server to another, making it difficult to actually trace them.
It is important to stress and focus on the circumstance that in both cases the infringement cau-
sing an indemnifiable damage could not have been carried out without the use of the Google platform. It 
is thus of the essence, for purposes of law enforcement, that Google itself be targeted by judicial orders 
in order to prevent a perpetuation of the infringement16. 
20. This solution can be transposed to defamation cases where it is essential for the judiciary to 
enforce their decisions in the digital space, where the violation occurs. Many people have died around 
the globe as a result of cyberbullying and revenge porn. Italy is still mourning the suicide of Tiziana 
Cantone, 31 years old, who was unable to enforce her right to have Facebook and YouTube remove a 
video taken by her former boyfriend.  
21. Private international rules inspired by the need to protect victims of violations carried out in 
the digital space cannot be limited to enforcement in the place of residence of the victim. The need to make 
multiple fora available, as a natural consequence of the principle of favor laesi, was already stated by the 
2011 eDate judgment of the CJEU17. In many cases it is not necessary or urgent for the victim to receive 
compensation at home, whereas it is essential and perhaps sufficient to receive compensation on line. 
22. De-indexation by Google and/or by the relevant search engine is in fact sufficient to bring 
these unlawful acts to an end.
2. Favor Laesi 
23. The principle of favor laesi, already acknowledged by EU private international law, can 
provide useful guidance on escaping the aterritoriality of cyberspace.
24. The first consequence of the principle is that relevance must be given to the place of esta-
blishment of the victim claiming damages. Their place of establishment can serve as a connecting factor 
in torts committed via the digital platform by users. As the case of Wintersteiger shows, this result is not 
incompatible with the rules of Brussels I, nor with those of Brussels I bis.
25. A second consequence can lead to the place where the conduct causing the damage occurred. 
The EU Court of Justice first acknowledged this possibility in the context of the Brussels Convention, 
but the Rome II Regulation also gives some room to this approach. 
As pointed out in Wintersteiger, the law of the country in which the action or the omission that 
triggered the damage “is decided” can provide a more significant connecting factor for torts and afford 
better protection for the victim.
26. A place for this approach is explicitly conceded by Article 7 in the case of environmental 
damages, but it is implicitly authorised in more general terms and for all torts by Article 4 of the Rome 
16 The EU is considering means to institutionalise the role of certain tech firms as gatekeepers. See, e.g., Regulating dig-
ital gatekeepers Background on the future digital markets act, on line at “https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/
BRIE/2020/659397/EPRS_BRI(2020)659397_EN.pdf.
17 See CJEU, 25 October 2011 eDate Advertising, [ECLI:EU:C:2011:68 ], a case concerning a company based in Austria and 
operating an Internet portal accessible at the address www.rainbow.at. The plaintiffs were seeking compensation for the alleged 
infringement of personality rights by means of content placed online on an internet site. The CJEU recalled that, as in Fiona She-
vill, C-68/93, ECLI:EU:C:1995:61, compensation for the entire damage suffered by the victim could be brought before the courts 
of the Member State of the place of establishment of the person who posted that content or before the courts of the Member State 
in which his centre of interests is situated, whereas the courts of any Member State in the territory of which information placed on 
the network is or has been accessible could exercise jurisdiction only in respect of the damage occurred in their own legal order.
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II Regulation18. According to Article 7 of the Rome II Regulation, the law of “the country in which the 
event giving rise to the damage occurred” applies as an alternative locus delicti to the one where the da-
mage occurred.19 The sole reason for this solution being codified for environmental damages only seems 
to be connected to the EU institutions’ present practice as regards codification of CJEU case law20. In 
other words, since the solution was adopted in 1976 in a case concerning the pollution of the river Rhein, 
it has become part of the acquis communautaire in relation to environmental damages.  
Comparative law offers many examples of this twofold interpretation of the locus damni in fa-
vour of the victim – also known as the Günstigkeitsprinzip. In Italy, an optio legis allowing an injured 
party to base her claim on the law of the place of the harmful event in lieu of the law of the place of the 
wrongful act was introduced as part of the 1995 reform (Article 62 of the Italian private international 
law statute)21. In Germany, the principle of favor laesi was also part of the 1999 reform (see Article 40(1) 
EGBGB)22.
A) Favor Laesi in Contract Law
27. The place of residence of a weaker party may also translate as “the place in which the con-
tract is performed and executed” in all cases where litigation concerns the delivery of goods and the 
performance of services. Even when the recipient is not a consumer, it will mostly be “at home” that 
the good is received or the film downloaded (art. 7-1 b Brussels I bis.  The residence of the user offers a 
good compromise: it is “the presumable place of most downloading and platform accesses” and guaran-
tees legal certainty. Unlike what happens in the case of torts, the rules of the Rome I Regulation are less 
suitable for guaranteeing such an outcome and need revision for the needs of the digital marketplace.
B) Favor Laesi in Crowdworking 
28. Work services provided on line are particularly problematic. It is a recognised fact that mi-
crowork platforms – platforms that offer micro-tasks ranging from translation services to homework tu-
toring etc – risk hiding particularly relevant human rights violations such as child labour or exploitation 
of workers resulting in severe illnesses23. Characterising these violations is problematic in that they may 
at the same time give rise  to tortious and contractual liability. 
29. Article 21 b i) Brussels Ibis seems adequate in the EU context, especially when coupled with 
Article 8 of the Rome Regulation and its escape clause of Article 4(3). On the more global internet scale, 
reference to the legal order under which the worker carries out the tasks obtained via the platform may 
well lead to distortions of the market. On the one hand, this criterion has the advantage of putting the 
situation of workers employed or “intermediated” by digital platforms on an equal footing with that of 
their competitors working in the physical market around them.
18 A. Peter/s. gless/ch. thomale/M.-Ph. Weller, Business and Human Rights: Making the Legally Binding Instrument 
Work in Public, Private and Criminal Law (26 March 2020). Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law & International 
Law (MPIL) Research Paper Nº 06-2020. Available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3561482 accessed 
20 November 2020
19 See I. PretellI, “La legge applicabile alle obbligazioni non contrattuali nel Regolamento «Roma II»”, in Bonomi (ed.) 
Diritto internazionale privato e cooperazione giudiziaria in materia civile (Giappichelli 2009) 449 on Art. 7 EU Regulation 
864/2007 ss.
20 The principle was originally set in the context of Handelskwekerij G. J. Bier v.  Mines de potasse d‘Alsace, 21/76, 
ECLI:EU:C:1976:166.
21 L. n. 218/1995. 
22 See J. von heIn, Das Günstigkeitsprinzip im Internationalen Deliktsrecht, Tübingen, 1999, passim; g. schmIdt, Ehrver-
letzungen in der elektronischen Presse, Bern, 2020.
23 See J. berg/m. furrers/e. harmon/u. ranIs/m s. sIlberman, Digital labour platforms and the future of work, Towards 
decent work in the online world, ILO Office, Geneva, 2018. 
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30. However, the level of protection of the law of the place “from which the employee habitually 
carries out his work in performance of the contract” may be very low, thus leading to social dumping, 
paving the way for unfair competition and creating a race to the bottom. Backroom operations such as 
content moderation tasks, content-creating, editing, type-setting, call centres and a wide variety of ac-
tivities that can be performed on line are outsourced to low-labour-standard countries, including India, 
where educated and skilled workers are available at a significantly lower cost and round the clock. 
31. “As a combination of the words “crowd” and “outsourcing” suggest, the word’s origins 
directly refer to the economic motivations for businesses’ use of crowdsourcing – cheaper, on-demand 
labour.”24 In addition, digital workers find themselves in a self-contained regime where they feel subject 
to the platform’s terms and conditions25 even when they perform the tasks for another user. Recent case 
law shows that private ordering is unable to provide the protection that states grant to workers in the 
relationship with their employer or client. Such relationships are always governed by a law, to be iden-
tified through private international law. 
32. In line with the recent initiatives on Human Rights Due Diligence26, destination-based la-
bour standards would appear to be the most appropriate way of preventing negative externalities and 
ensuring greater consistency across the digital society in which these workers operate. This article su-
ggests that the law applicable to crowdwork should be the law of the place where the client/employer is 
based. This would guarantee fairer competition that is favourable to social progress. Firstly, this would 
equalise the conditions and prices of services in a given market and neutralise social dumping. Secondly, 
it would increase the appeal of platform work in countries such as India, thus favouring a race to the 
top. The change may seem radical but once placed in the context of the “digital revolution” it could turn 
out to be the simplest natural consequence and appropriate legal reaction to the digitalisation of work. 
III. Relations Between a User and a Platform Exercising Decisive Control
Private international law problems arising between a platform user and the platform itself should 
also be solved with an eye to the imbalance between the two parties, thus granting enhanced protection 
to the weaker one. 
1. When the Platform Exercises Decisive Control
33. Recently, the Court of Justice has given a provisional solution to the problem of defining the 
employment status of chauffeurs working via affiliation with a platform. Up to now there has been no 
consistency across national courts as to the definition of gig workers: some decisions have recognised 
their subordinate status, others denied it and still others have considered them to be a mixture of the two. 
34. The digital platform’s role in the organisation of the service27 is considered decisive in cha-
racterising the gig workers providing that service. 
24 J. berg/m. furrers/e. harmon/u. ranIs/m s. sIlberman, Digital labour platforms and the future of work, Towards 
decent work in the online world, ILO Office, Geneva, 2018, p. 3.
25 Ibidem, at 22 ff. 
26 M. A.Cherry, , A Global System of Work, A Global System of Regulation?: Crowdwork and Conflicts of Law. Tulane 
Law Review, Vol. 94, 2019, Saint Louis University School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2019-11 , Available at 
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3523303
27 See also CJEU, 12 July 2011,  L’Oréal SA et al. v  eBay International AG et al., [ECLI:EU:C:2011:474] distinguishing, 
pt. 113, “the case where the service provider plays an active role of such a kind as to give it knowledge of, or control over, 
those data (Google France and Google, paragraphs 114 and 120)” from the case where the service provider confines “itself to 
providing that service neutrally by a merely technical and automatic processing of the data provided by its customers”.
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35. A case where “the service at issue in the main proceedings merely enables… the activity 
consisting in putting persons wishing to make a journey in the urban area in contact only with licensed 
taxi drivers whose activity pre-exists and for whom that intermediation service constitutes only one 
method, among others, of obtaining customers, which, moreover, they are in no way obliged to use” is 
an information society service within the meaning of Article 1(2) of Directive 98/34/EC as amended by 
Directive 98/48/EC28.
36. This situation is clearly differentiated from that of “the intermediation service” at issue in 
the case giving rise to the judgment of 20 December 2017, Asociación Profesional Elite Taxi (C-434/15, 
EU:C:2017: 981), which created and made accessible the provision of travel services in the urban area 
by non-professional drivers who had previously been absent from the market. In the case of Uber, the 
treatment of drivers will eventually lead to their characterisation as employees29.
37. Characterisation influences the applicable rules on jurisdiction. An employee has the benefit 
of the choice granted by art. 21, Brussels I bis, allowing him to sue the employer in the forum rei or in the 
place where the work is carried out (or in the last place where work was carried out). If these two options 
point to more than one place (for instance when the employee travels for work), the special forum is in 
the place where the business that engaged the employee is or was situated.
38. The choice of forum is regulated by the relevant rule of Article 23 Brussels Ibis which provi-
des that choice of forum agreements may only be concluded a posteriori, “after the dispute has arisen” 
(unless the agreements may only favour them). 
39. The CJEU and national courts have used these principles to re-establish an egalité des armes 
in platform-related litigation without impairing the attractiveness of the European market place.
The only limits to the protection of the weak party in the European system derive from the prin-
ciple of legal certainty, whereby foreseeability of the forum and of the applicable law by the platform 
must be ensured. 
40. In most cases, the courts of the employee’s place of domicile will apply the lex fori as a 
consequence of the Rome I Regulation.
The Regulation lists, as connecting factors for employees: “the law of the country in which or, 
failing that, from which the employee habitually carries out his work in performance of the contract” 
(art.8-2), and the country where the place of business through which the employee was engaged is si-
tuated (art. 8.3). Even though workers may choose a different law (art.8-1), or be subject to it by virtue 
of the escape clause (art. 84), in the majority of cases workers will be able to litigate “at home” and can 
expect the “home” labour standards to govern their relationship with their employers.
2. When the Platform Does not Exercise Decisive Control
41. In another hypothesis, as affirmed by the CJEU in the case Airbnb Ireland30, the platform is 
considered to be a simple intermediary.
28 CJEU, 3 December 2020,  Star Taxi App SRL, [ECLI:EU:C:2020:980].
29 CJEU, 20 December 2017, Asociación Profesional Elite Taxi [EU:C:2017: 981] and CJEU, 10 April 2018, Uber France 
SAS v Nabil Bensalem, [ECLI:EU:C:2018:221].
30  See CJEU, 19 December 2019 [ECLI:EU:C:2019:1112] pts. 57 “As such, it follows that an intermediation service 
such as the one provided by Airbnb Ireland cannot be regarded as forming an integral part of an overall service, the main 
component of which is the provision of accommodation”; 65 “the rules for the functioning of an intermediation service such 
as the one provided by Airbnb cannot be equated to those of the intermediation service which gave rise to the judgments of 
20 December 2017, Asociación Profesional Elite Taxi (C434/15, EU:C:2017:981, paragraph 39), and of 10 April 2018, Uber 
France (C320/16, EU:C:2018:221, paragraph 21)”; 69 “an intermediation service which, by means of an electronic platform, is 
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42. The European Commission in its “European agenda for the collaborative economy” uses the 
following criteria to assess the decisiveness of the platforms’ control: 
“(1)  Price: does the collaborative platform set the final price to be paid by the user, as the reci-
pient of the underlying service. Where the collaborative platform is only recommending a 
price or where the underlying services provider is otherwise free to adapt the price set by 
a collaborative platform, this indicates that this criterion may not be met.  
 (2)  Other key contractual terms: does the collaborative platform set terms and conditions, 
other than price, which determine the contractual relationship between the underlying 
services provider and the user (such as for example setting mandatory instructions for the 
provision of the underlying service, including any obligation to provide the service). 
 (3)  Ownership of key assets: does the collaborative platform own the key assets used to pro-
vide the underlying service.”31
Once it is established that the platform is not per se an employer but a mere intermediary, a dis-
tinction must be made between cases involving consumers and cases involving businesses.
43. Is it really so? 
Some scholars have cast doubt on the legitimacy of making a distinction between business-to-
consumer (B2C) and business-to-business (B2B) relationships when the counterparty is a tech giant32. 
Ebay ‘power sellers’ and ‘Airbnb landlords’ are professional platform users that may certainly 
be considered to have a B2B relationship with the platform, but what about the small and medium com-
panies obliged to use the platform to survive in the market? 
44. This doubt has reached the Court of Justice in a case that pits a German company that runs 
hotels against the platform booking.com33.
The importance of booking.com has reached such a scale that no hotel can possibly avoid being 
a platform user. 
Booking.com has offices in 70 countries, employs 17,000 workers and manages the booking of 
over 1.6 million overnight stays every 24 hours. It has over 28 million listings across 228 countries and 
is available in 43 languages34.
When they agree to display their establishment on the platform, professional users are subject to 
the following clause “Save as set out otherwise in this Agreement, this Agreement shall be exclusively 
governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the Netherlands”. This clause concerns solely 
B2B relations and has recently been challenged before the Court of Justice of the European Union. 
A German company that operates a hotel in Schleswig-Holstein (Germany) has assumed that the 
continuous modification – to the advantage of booking.com – of the general conditions of the platform’s 
B2B contracts is an infringement of fair competition law. Basing its claim on German competition law, 
the German company has seized the Landgericht Kiel (Kiel Regional Court, Germany). In that context, 
intended to connect, for remuneration, potential guests with professional or non-professional hosts offering short-term accom-
modation services, while also providing a certain number of services ancillary to that intermediation service, must be classified 
as an ‘information society service’ under Directive 2000/31”.
31 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions, A European agenda for the collaborative economy, {SWD(2016) 184 final} 
Brussels, 2.6.2016, COM(2016) 356 final.
32 P. franzIna, “Promoting Fairness and Transparency for Business Users of Online Platforms: The Role of Private Interna-
tional Law, in I. PretellI (ed), Conflict of laws in the maze of digital platforms/Le droit international privé dans le labyrinthe 
des plateformes digitales, Actes de la 30e Journée de droit international privé du 28 juin 2018 à Lausanne, Zurich 2019, p. 
147 et seq.; 
33 The case is extensively presented by P. favrod-coune, “The legal position of the weaker party in B2B relationships with 
online platforms in the European Union, an analysis of dispute resolution mechanisms in Regulation (EU) 2019/1150”, Year-
book of Private International Law, Volume 21, 2019/2020, pp. 523-548.
34 Ibidem. 
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the German company has claimed that it is forced to enter into contracts with booking.com because of 
the latter’s dominant position on the market and has asked that its unfair practices, which plainly cons-
titute an abuse of a dominant position, be declared contrary to competition law; the German company 
has therefore asked the judge to order booking.com to refrain from continuing such practices. Again, 
enforcement is sought on the platform itself. 
45. On 24 November 2020 the CJEU stated that Article 7(2) of the Brussels I bis Regulation 
applies “to an action seeking an injunction against certain practices implemented in the context of the 
contractual relationship between the applicant and the defendant, based on an allegation of abuse of a 
dominant position by the latter in breach of competition law”35. 
The judgment adheres to the AG opinion delivered in September 2020 and clearly reverses the 
earlier Brogsitter judgment36, which could have allowed the cause of action based on delict to fall under 
the concept of ‘matter relating to contract’ within the meaning of Article 7(1), since the action concerns 
a harmful event that also constitutes a breach of a contractual obligation.
In addition, the court fails to give relevance to the weakness of one of the Bs in the B2B contract. 
46. It is increasingly apparent that small and medium businesses require protection similar to 
that of consumers in cross-border disputes with a digital platform.
Activities such as “publishing books, lecturing, operating websites, fundraising” have already 
been declared not inconsistent with the notion of consumer, since the contracting parties’ relationship 
continues to be characterised by substantial inequality of bargaining strength37. 
47. It is fair enough to wonder whether, in the future, the protection granted to consumers by 
art. 18 of EU Regulation 1215/2012, offering a choice between the courts of the Member State of 
the consumer’s domicile and the forum rei, should not be extended to “weak parties” as compared to 
“strong” ones, which by virtue of their strength may easily defend themselves in the forum actoris – i.e. 
the domicile of the weaker one38. 
48. The prohibition of clauses creating a “significant imbalance” could be aimed not only at pro-
tecting consumers in B2C contracts but also at fair competition in B2B contracts, since this category of 
mandatory rules may well include forum and law selection clauses that substantially erode consumers’ 
access to justice.
49. In a case concerning Facebook, the Paris Appellate Court affirmed French jurisdiction and 
decided on the merits of a case between the platform Facebook and one of its users, who was domiciled 
in France: “Les difficultés pratiques et le coût d’accès aux juridictions californiennes sont de nature à 
35 See CJEU, 24 November 2020, Wikingerhof GmbH & Co. KG v Booking.com BV, [ECLI:EU:C:2020:950].
36 See CJEU, 13 March 2014, Brogsitter, [ EU:C:2014:148], pt. 18 and also CJEU, 14 July 2016, Granarolo SpA contre 
Ambrosi Emmi France SA [ECLI:EU:C:2016:559] stating that Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 
December 2000 means that “an action for damages founded on an abrupt termination of a long-standing business relationship, 
such as the termination at issue in the main proceedings, is not a matter relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict within the mean-
ing of that regulation if a tacit contractual relationship existed between the parties, a matter which is for the referring court to 
ascertain. Demonstration of the existence of a tacit contractual relationship of that kind must be based on a body of consistent 
evidence, which may include in particular the existence of a long-standing business relationship, the good faith between the 
parties, the regularity of the transactions and their development over time expressed in terms of quantity and value, any agree-
ments as to prices charged and/or discounts granted, and the correspondence exchanged.”
37 CJEU, 25 January 2018, Maximilian Schrems v Facebook Ireland Limited [ECLI:EU:C:2018:37] pt. 41 “activities of 
publishing books, lecturing, operating websites, fundraising and being assigned the claims of numerous consumers for the pur-
pose of their enforcement do not entail the loss of a private Facebook account user’s status as a ‘consumer’ within the meaning 
of that article”. 
38 Cp. P. franzIna (note 29), p. 149, regretting that Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council(EU) 
2019/1150 on promoting fairness and transparency for business users of online intermediation services applicable as of 20 July 
2020 does not contain any specific protective provisions on private international law. 
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dissuader le consommateur d’exercer toute action devant les juridictions concernant l’application du 
contrat et à le priver de tout recours à l’encontre de la société Facebook Inc; qu’à l’inverse, cette dernière 
a une agence en France et dispose de ressources financières et humaines qui lui permettent d’assurer 
sans difficulté sa représentation et sa défense devant les juridictions françaises”39.
The authors of the decisions give relevance to the significant imbalance (désequilibre significa-
tif) between the resources of the platform and those of its users.
Similar words are used by the Supreme Court of Canada, with reference to the gross inequality 
of bargaining power as the main reason for not enforcing a forum selection clause between Facebook 
and one of its users.40
IV. Some Conclusions
50. If appropriately adapted, private international rules have already offered well-shaped solu-
tions in most digital litigation cases, especially as regards connecting factors available for torts within 
the EU.
51. Connecting factors serve all the functions of private international law: allocating jurisdic-
tion, identifying the applicable law, as well as serving as vectors for the recognition and enforcement of 
decisions and acts. 
52. In cases pitting platform users against each other, the most reliable guiding principles are the 
principle of effectiveness and that of favor laesi.
Wider application of favor laesi is being promoted in order to allow persons who have suffered 
harm as a result of using digital platforms to benefit from the Günstigkeitsprinzip – if necessary through 
an adaptation of the exception clause in the Rome II Regulation. 
A series of successful cases has been decided – on the basis of these principles – by fora actoris, 
and most of them have required (compulsory) collaboration by digital platforms in allowing enforce-
ment of court decisions in cyberspace itself.
Digital platforms have represented the relevant area of enforcement in most cases of litigation 
between platform users, because de-indexation – or similar platform adjustments – are often both neces-
sary and sufficient to put an end to the damage. 
53. In the long run, enhanced protection of persons entering into on-line contracts will even-
tually have to be recognised through an extension of the principle of favor laesi to suppliers of work 
services, by analogy with the most recent development of human rights due diligence. 
In this context, standard protection clauses leading to destination-based labour standards, when 
promoted by an international organisation such as the ILO, would represent a major advancement41.
The same principle may provide guidance with regard to litigation pitting a user against the 
platform in every situation where there is a need to redress the significant imbalance of power between 
the digital platform and the average business person. 
54. The financial and human resources available do not enable the parties to represent and 
defend themselves on an equal footing before foreign courts. Business users, often forced to use the 
platform to survive in their own marketplace, may not always be equipped with the armoury they need 
to defend themselves on equal terms before the jurisdiction selected on the basis of the choice-of-forum 
standard clause imposed by the platform on the assumption that it concerns peer-to-peer relations.
39 Cour d’appel de Paris, 12 Février 2016, (n° 2016-58, 6 pages). 
40 Douez v. Facebook, Inc., 2017 SCC 33, [2017] 1 S.C.R. 751.  
41 See I. PretellI, “Improving Social Cohesion through Connecting Factors in the Conflict of Laws of the Platform Econ-
omy”, in Conflict of laws in the maze of digital platforms (note 29), pp. 46-47.
